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Abstract
This essay is a contribution to the forthcoming Oxford University Press Handbook of
Corporate Law and Governance edited by Jeffery Gordon and Georg Ringe. In the 1960s
and 1970s, corporate law and finance scholars recognized that neither discipline was
doing a very good job of explaining how corporations were really structured and performed. For legal scholars, Yale Law School professor and then Stanford Law School
dean Bayless Manning confessed that corporate law has “nothing left but our great empty
corporation statutes -towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together
and containing nothing but wind.” Michael Jensen and William Meckling made a similar
comment with respect to finance. The theory of the firm was an “empty box” or a “black
box” that provided no theory about “how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium.” The result of Jensen and Meckling’s seminal reframing of corporate law in agency cost terms, and so into something far broader than disputes
over statutory language, was that both Manning’s empty skyscrapers and Jensen and
Meckling’s empty box began to be filled. The essay proceeds by tracking how corporate
law became corporate governance – from legal rules standing alone to legal rules interacting with non-legal processes and institutions – through three somewhat idiosyncratically chosen but nonetheless related examples of how we have come to usefully complicate
the inquiry into the structures that bear on corporate decision-making and performance.
Part I frames the first level of complication in moving from law to governance by defining
governance broadly as the company’s operating system, a braided framework encompassing legal and non-legal elements. Part II then adds a second level of complication
by treating corporate governance dynamically: corporate governance becomes a path
dependent outcome of the tools available when a national governance system begins
taking shape, and the process by which elements are added to the governance system
going forward – driven by what Paul Milgrom and John Roberts call “supermodularity.”
That characteristic reads importantly on both the difficulty of corporate governance, as
opposed to corporate law, reform and the non-intuitive pattern of the results of reform:
significant reform leads to things getting worse before they get better. Part II then further
complicates corporate governance by expanding it beyond the boundaries of the corporation, treating particular governance regimes as complementary to other social structures –
for example, the labor market, the capital market and the political structure – that together
define different varieties of capitalism. Next, Part III considers commonplace, but I will
suggest misguided, efforts to take a different tack from Parts I and II: to simplify rather
than complicate corporate governance analysis by recourse to now familiar single factor
analytic models: stakeholder theory, team production, director primacy, and shareholder
primacy. Part III suggests that these reductions are neither models nor particularly helpful; they neither bridge the contextual specificity of most corporate governance analysis
nor address the necessary interaction in allocating responsibilities among shareholders,
teams and directors. As well, these “models” are static rather than dynamic, a serious
failing in an era in which the second derivative of change is positive in many business
environments and Schumpeter seems to be getting the better of Burke. Part IV concludes
by examining the importance of a corporate governance system’s capacity to respond to
changes in the business environment: the greater the rate of change, the more important
is a governance system’s capacity to adapt and the less important its ability to support
long-term firm-specific investment.
Keywords: Corporate law, corporate governance, comparative corporate governance,
varieties of capitalism, team production, director primacy, shareholder primacy, stakeholders, path dependency, dynamic corprate governance, short-termism
JEL Classifications: K2, L2, M13, M140, P1, P5
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Abstract
This essay is a contribution to the forthcoming Oxford University Press Handbook of
Corporate Law and Governance edited by Jeffery Gordon and Georg Ringe. In the 1960s and
1970s, corporate law and finance scholars recognized that neither discipline was doing a very
good job of explaining how corporations were really structured and performed. For legal
scholars, Yale Law School professor and then Stanford Law School dean Bayless Manning
confessed that corporate law has “nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but
wind.” Michael Jensen and William Meckling made a similar comment with respect to finance.
The theory of the firm was an “empty box” or a “black box” that provided no theory about
“how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium.” The
result of Jensen and Meckling’s seminal reframing of corporate law in agency cost terms, and so
into something far broader than disputes over statutory language, was that both Manning’s
empty skyscrapers and Jensen and Meckling’s empty box began to be filled
The essay proceeds by tracking how corporate law became corporate governance –
from legal rules standing alone to legal rules interacting with non-legal processes and
institutions – through three somewhat idiosyncratically chosen but nonetheless related
examples of how we have come to usefully complicate the inquiry into the structures that bear
on corporate decision-making and performance. Part I frames the first level of complication in
moving from law to governance by defining governance broadly as the company’s operating
system, a braided framework encompassing legal and non-legal elements. Part II then adds a
second level of complication by treating corporate governance dynamically: corporate
governance becomes a path dependent outcome of the tools available when a national
governance system begins taking shape, and the process by which elements are added to the
governance system going forward – driven by what Paul Milgrom and John Roberts call
“supermodularity.” That characteristic reads importantly on both the difficulty of corporate
governance, as opposed to corporate law, reform and the non-intuitive pattern of the results of
reform: significant reform leads to things getting worse before they get better. Part II then
further complicates corporate governance by expanding it beyond the boundaries of the

Marc & Evan Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School; Charles J. Meyers
Professor of Law and Business emeritus, Stanford Law School; and European Corporate
Governance Institute. I am grateful to Jeffrey Gordon, Henry Hansmann and Curtis Milhaupt for
comments on earlier versions of this chapter and to Jeffrey Gordon for his encouragement to
write it.
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corporation, treating particular governance regimes as complementary to other social
structures – for example, the labor market, the capital market and the political structure – that
together define different varieties of capitalism. Next, Part III considers commonplace, but I
will suggest misguided, efforts to take a different tack from Parts I and II: to simplify rather than
complicate corporate governance analysis by recourse to now familiar single factor analytic
models: stakeholder theory, team production, director primacy, and shareholder primacy. Part
III suggests that these reductions are neither models nor particularly helpful; they neither
bridge the contextual specificity of most corporate governance analysis nor address the
necessary interaction in allocating responsibilities among shareholders, teams and directors. As
well, these “models” are static rather than dynamic, a serious failing in an era in which the
second derivative of change is positive in many business environments and Schumpeter seems
to be getting the better of Burke. Part IV concludes by examining the importance of a
corporate governance system’s capacity to respond to changes in the business environment:
the greater the rate of change, the more important is a governance system’s capacity to adapt
and the less important its ability to support long-term firm-specific investment.

In 1962, Bayless Manning, the Yale Law School corporate law scholar and later Stanford
Law School dean, announced the death of corporate law. Writing evocatively about a subject
that was at the time deadly boring, Manning wrote:

[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the
United States. When American law ceased to take the "corporation"
seriously, the entire body of law that had been built upon that
intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We have
nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes -towering
skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and
containing nothing but wind.1

1

Bayless Manning, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 Yale L.J.
223, 245n.37 (1962). Manning’s dirge for corporate law was hardly limited to the U.S. Speaking
in broader geographic terms, Manning expanded his point. “Those of us in academic life who
have specialized in corporation law face technological unemployment, or at least substantial
retooling. There is still a good bit of work to be done to persuade someone to give a decent
burial to the shivering skeletons. And there will be plenty of work overseas for a long time to
come, for in Latin America, and to a lesser extent on the Continent, the ‘corporation' yet thrives
and breeds as it did in this country eighty years ago.” Id.
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Manning bemoaned that the corporate statute – the rusted girders of his metaphor that
provided the formal structure of the enterprise – no longer was enough to understand what
really mattered: how the corporation performed. Once the formalism of the statute was
recognized as insufficient to itself explain the true matter of concern, the conclusion followed:
nothing was left but wind.
Manning’s lament could be written off as just a law professor’s realization that his
discipline no longer explained enough about actual corporation behavior. But the concern was
not limited to legal scholars; the same realization was coming to the surface in financial
economics. In 1976, Jensen and Meckling provided what became the canonical account of the
corporation in Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and the Theory of the
Firm.2 Addressing a different literature, Jensen & Meckling educed a metaphor similar to
Manning’s: the theory of the firm in economics was an “empty box.”3
While the literature of economics is replete with references to the
“theory of the firm”, the material generally subsumed under that
heading is not a theory of the firm but actually a theory of markets in
which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated
so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions …. Except for a few
recent and tentative steps, however, we have no theory which
explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants
are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result.4
Jensen and Meckling focused centrally on the concept of agency costs – the cost of
techniques to align the incentives of the different participants necessary to conducting the
corporation’s business. From their perspective, the corporation was a “form of legal fiction
2

Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 3 J.Fin.Econ. 305 (1976).
3 Id. at 306.
4 Id. at 306-07,
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which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the
existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.”5 Reframed in
current Silicon Valley terminology, the corporation is a multi-sided platform that integrates
inputs on the one hand and customers on the other.

The intellectual impact of the agency cost characterization is hard to overstate: for the
last 40 years, the mission of American corporate law, and of corporate scholarship more
broadly, has taken the form of a search for the organizational Holy Grail, a technique that
bridges the separation of ownership and control by aligning the interests of shareholders and
managers through a series of techniques, over time highlighting the role of independent
directors, hostile takeovers and activist shareholders in this effort.6 This coalescence around
corporate law as a vehicle to produce shareholder profits hit its high point when Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, in an article confidently titled “The End of History for
Corporate Law, ” concluded that “in key commercial jurisdictions … there is no longer any
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-

5

Id. At 311 (emphasis omitted).
Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions
Matter?, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 327, 330 (1996). The literature and the courts are now beginning to
address what happens to this theory and the case law derived from it when corporations have
increasingly concentrated ownership, albeit in the form of institutions as record holders for
their beneficiaries, what Jeffrey Gordon and I have called “Agency Capitalism.” See Ronald J.
Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon: The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Col. L. Rev. 883 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity Intermediation, in Research
Handbook on Shareholder Power (J. Hill & R. Thomas eds., 2015).
6

4

term shareholder value.”7

The result of Jensen and Meckling’s seminal reframing of corporate law into something
far broader than disputes over statutory language was that both Manning’s empty skyscrapers
and Jensen and Meckling’s empty box began to be filled. And it was no coincidence that the
term “corporate governance” appeared at about this time.8 Over a reasonably short period of
time, corporate governance codes appeared, like that of the OECD,9 that ranged much more
broadly than the limited coverage of a particular national (or state) corporate statute. Perhaps
most aggressively, in 1997 during the East Asian Financial crisis the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank included corporate governance reform as a condition to assistance
alongside traditional macroeconomic restraints such as deficit reduction.10 Academic attention

7

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 745
(2001).
8 Brian R, Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate
Governance (2013), nicely tracks the emergence of the term corporate governance. He notes
that the term only came into vogue in the 1970s in a single country – the United States. One
outcome of this shift was that the “technological unemployment” that Manning feared did not
arise. Hostile takeovers, a response to agency costs made broadly possible by the development
of junk bonds, generated enormous amounts of work and profits for fancy law firms. Lincon
Caplan, Skadden: Power, Money, and the Rise of a Legal Empire Chap. 5 (1993) captures the
phenomenon.
9 A current compilation of current country and NGO corporate governance codes can be found
at the European Corporate Governance Institute web site:
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/index.php. For examples of the governance codes of large public
and private institutional investors, see, e.g., Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., Global Principles of
Accountable Corporate GovernancE (2015), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/formspublications/global-principles-corporate-governance.pdf; BlackRock, Proxy Voting Guidelines
for U.S. Securities, available at http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/literature/factsheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf.
10 See, e.g., Timothy Lane, et al., "IMF- Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand,"
72-73 (Int'l Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 178, 1999); "Asia Pacific Talks Vow Tough
Action on Economic Crisis," N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1997, p.A1.
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followed the same growth pattern. For example, more than a quarter of all articles published in
the Journal of Financial Economics, one of the two leading finance journals, from 1995 through
August 29, 2013 were related to corporate governance.11

But what has been filling the empty skyscrapers and boxes? The short answer is that
the new content has addressed the variety and interaction of contracts – formal contracts,
implicit contracts 12 and the braiding of the two13 – that Jensen and Meckling’s treatment of the
corporation as a nexus of platforms invites. In the remainder of this Chapter, I will address
three somewhat idiosyncratically chosen but nonetheless related examples of the implications
of the shift from corporate law to corporate governance, from legal rules standing alone to
legal rules interacting with non-legal corporate processes and institutions. Of course, the point
is not to be exhaustive, nor even to provide a taxonomy covering the categories of the new
content that is filling empty skyscrapers and boxes; the number and breadth of the chapters in
this book make obvious that either effort necessarily exceeds my ambition here. Rather, my

11

Out of a total of 1,533 articles published by the Journal of Financial Economics between
January 1, 1995 and August 29, 2013, 414 (27 percent) dealt with corporate governance.
Author’s calculation.
12 The term “implicit contract” comes out of the labor economics literature. The critical point is
that, from a legal perspective, an implicit contract is not a contract at all: it has neither formal
terms nor formal enforcement. Rather it is a description of patterns of behavior that are
enforced by reputation markets. See Sherwin T. Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J. Econ.
Lit. 1144 (1985).
13 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 Col. L.Rev. 1377 (2010). The term
“braiding” reflects the potential for complementarity between formal law and explicit contracts
on the one hand and implicit contracts on the other. In this account formal law and explicit
contracts facilitate the development and maintenance of implicit contracts; in effect, the formal
components of the braid endogenize trust, the foundation for sustainable implicit contracts.
Id. at 1384.
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goal is more limited. The object is to provide examples of how this shift from corporate law to
corporate governance – from a largely legal focus to one that focuses on the corporation’s
inputs, outputs and how they are managed and, ultimately, the manner in which governance
interfaces with other institutional elements that make up a capitalist system -- complicates the
problem corporate scholars, of whatever mix of disciplines, have to confront.14
The Chapter proceeds by tracking how corporate law became corporate governance
through three examples of how we have come to usefully complicate the inquiry into the
structures that bear on corporate decision-making and performance. Part I frames the first
level of complication in moving from law to governance by defining governance broadly as the
company’s operating system, a braided framework encompassing legal and non-legal elements.
Part II then adds a second level of complication by treating corporate governance dynamically:
corporate governance becomes a path dependent outcome of the tools available when a
national governance system begins taking shape, and the process by which elements are added
to the governance system going forward – driven by what Paul Milgrom and John Roberts call
“supermodularity.”15 That characteristic reads importantly on both the difficulty of corporate
governance, as opposed to corporate law, reform and the non-intuitive pattern of the results of
reform: significant reform leads to things getting worse before they get better. Part II then
further complicates corporate governance by expanding it beyond the boundaries of the

14

Like Manning, I have a personal concern about the role of corporate law academics. On this
front, the shift from corporate law to corporate governance and to the role of corporate
governance in the larger structure of a capitalist economy has had the desirable result of
forcing corporate law academics to become interdisciplinary.
15 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese
Economic Organization, 9 Estudios Economicos 3 (1994).
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corporation, treating particular governance regimes as complementary to other social
structures – for example, the labor market, the capital market and the political structure – that
together define different varieties of capitalism. Part III then considers commonplace, but I will
suggest misguided, efforts to take a different tack from Parts I and II: to simplify rather than
complicate corporate governance analysis by recourse to now familiar single factor analytic
models in academic corporate law and governance: stakeholder theory, team production,
director primacy, and shareholder primacy. Part III suggests that these reductions are neither
models nor particularly helpful; they neither bridge the contextual specificity of most corporate
governance analysis nor address the necessary interaction in allocating responsibilities among
shareholders, teams and directors. As well, these “models” are static rather than dynamic, a
serious failing in an era in which the second derivative of change is positive in many business
environments and Schumpeter seems to be getting the better of Burke. Part IV concludes by
examining the importance of a corporate governance system’s capacity to respond to changes
in the business environment: the greater the rate of change, the more important is a
governance system’s capacity to adapt and the less important its ability to support long-term
firm-specific investment.
I. Corporate Governance as the Corporation’s Operating System
In teaching corporations, I ask at the beginning of the first class a seemingly simple
question: what is a corporation? After a predictable series of ever more complicated and

8

sophisticated responses from very smart students, I dramatically display16 a copy of a California
corporation’s articles of incorporation together with the Secretary of State’s certifying cover
page, on which appears attractive pictures of the California state animal (the grizzly bear) and
state flower (the California poppy).17 The corporation is nothing but a few pieces of paper I say,
leading up to a point similar to that made by Jensen & Meckling: corporations are best
understood not as a single thing but as the intersection of different things – recall that Jensen
and Meckling describe them as “legal fictions.”18 To be sure, the formalities are thin and
incomplete, but they are nonetheless important. For example, the corporate statute gives the
entity limited liability and unlimited life, features that caused the Economist in 1926 to equate
the corporation’s invention with the industrial revolution’s most important technological
innovations.19 But these are passive characteristics. Something more is necessary to bring the
golem to life.

This sets the stage for my real point. A corporation should be defined functionally by
reference to the structure that allows those pieces of paper to operate a business and makes it
possible for third parties to confidently do business with a legal fiction. Some of these
structures are legal rules that, in specified circumstances, allow the corporation to be treated,
16

At least I imagine that the students have that assessment of the gesture rather than a variety
of less flattering characterizations ranging from showboating to simply strange.
17 This was how the document looked at the time my class exemplar was issued. California, as
of 2014 the world’s 8th largest economy (Samanta Masunaga, We’re Number 8: California Near
the Top of World’s Largest Economies, Los Angeles Times, July 25, 2015), has statutorily
designated not only a state animal and state flower, but as well a state bird, a state amphibian,
a state fossil, a state insect and 28 other categories of designated state symbols. See California
Governance Code Sections 420-429.8.
18 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 310.
19 Economist, December 18, 1926.
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like Pinocchio, as if a real boy. However, the mass of the corporate structure, both in
importance and in bulk, is not legal at all. It consists of processes of information flow, decisionmaking, decision-implementation, and decision-monitoring: how the corporation (i) obtains the
information it uses in making, implementing, and monitoring the results of, its business
decisions (including information relevant to regulatory compliance); (ii) re-distributes
information from information originators to managers with sufficient expertise and experience
to evaluate it; and (iii) makes decisions, communicates decisions to the employees who
implement them, and then gathers information about the consequences, for the next round.

It is obvious that the formal corporate legal skeleton covers only a very small part of
how the corporation actually operates to carry out its business and continually adapts to its
business environment. In Bernard Black’s terms, most of the legal rules concerning the
corporation’s operations are “trivial,” in the sense that the rules are important only in the
circumstance that they are ignored despite how easily they are satisfied.20 The rest and
obviously most important part of the governance structure – the dark matter of corporate
governance – is the realm of reporting relationships, organizational charts, compensation
arrangements, information gathering and internal controls and monitoring, all largely nonlegally dictated policies, practices and procedures that do not appear in the corporate statute
or the corporation’s charter or bylaws. To be sure, non-legal governance processes can morph
into the “legal” when legislatures conclude that self-generated governance is less effective than

20

Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, A Political and Economic Analysis, 24 Nw. U.L.Rev.
542 (1990).
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social welfare demands. A familiar example: after the Enron/WorldCom accounting scandals,
Sarbanes-Oxley imposed a set of governance requirements over financial reporting, which
included external monitoring of internal controls, a specified board committee structure and
composition, and mandatory officer responsibilities But in general, even where the board has
compliance responsibilities, the implementation is for the firm to work out.
Put differently, corporate governance is the corporation’s operating system. This
characterization of governance in operational terms is reflected in the description of corporate
governance offered by the Business Roundtable, an organization composed of the CEOs of
many of the largest U.S. corporations:

A good corporate governance structure is a working system for principled
goal setting, effective decision making, and appropriate monitoring of
compliance and performance. Through this vibrant and responsive
structure, the CEO, the senior management team and the board of
directors can interact effectively and respond quickly and appropriately
to changing circumstances, within a framework of solid corporate values,
to provide enduring value to the shareholders who invest in the
enterprise.21

The end of the odd journey from corporate law to a more complex corporate
governance system would give Dean Manning solace. His skyscrapers have been filled to
overflowing, but formal law and the corporate statute occupies far fewer floors in the building.
The outcome of this integration of law and managerial mechanisms puts law in an important
but plainly subordinate role in the corporation’s operating system:

21

“Principles of Corporate Governance 2005,” Business Roundtable, November 2005, p. 6.
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Investors provide to a corporation the funds with which it acquires real
assets. The investors receive in return financial claims (securities) on
the corporation’s future cash flows. The size of these future cash flows
then depends importantly on management’s choice of what real assets
to acquire and how well these assets are managed over time. The
capital market’s pricing of the financial claims acquired by investors is
in effect a valuation of these future cash flows. Corporate law provides
a framework within which a firm’s managers make these investment
and operating decisions. Properly designed, this legal framework helps
spur management to choose and deploy assets in ways that maximize
the value of the firm’s expected future cash flows. … The better
corporate and securities law perform[s] these tasks, the more valuable
the corporation’s underlying business and correspondingly, the
financial claims that the corporation issues.22
II. Path Dependence: Corporate Governance, Complementarity, and Supermodularity
The second effort to complicate corporate governance adds a dynamic dimension.
Corporate governance is path dependent – history matters importantly.23 In a path-dependent
environment with factors such as increasing returns and network externalities, an observed
equilibrium may be inefficient compared to arrangements possible at the time of the
comparison that were not available when the arrangements arose. Initial conditions,
determined by fortuitous events or non-economic factors such as culture, politics, or
geography, can start the system down a specific path. For example, Silicon Valley’s
development alongside the San Francisco Bay area next to Stanford University, as opposed to

22

Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and the Integration of Law
and Finance, 116 Col. L. Rev. 325, 327-28. 2016).
23 Among the efforts to apply path dependency to corporate governance, see Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52,
Stan. L.Rev. 127 (1999); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U.L.Q 347
(1996); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions
Matter?, 74 Wash. U.L.Q 327 (1996).
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the shores of Lake Michigan where Northwestern and the University of Chicago are about the
same distance from each other as are Stanford and the University of California at Berkeley,
depended importantly on initial conditions. These included Stanford’s hiring Frederick Terman
as dean of the engineering school shortly after World War II. Terman had directed one of the
Cambridge, Massachusetts, wartime labs that sought to bring cutting edge science to bear in
support of the war effort and so recognized the value of translational research, that is, the link
between university research and its practical application. 24 Put simply, “history matters.”25
That history matters influences the dynamics of the system ought to be understood. In
particular, history’s shadow can make reforming current institutions or adjusting to changes in
a company’s product difficult despite the later existence of alternatives that, absent transition
costs, would be more efficient. In the context of corporate governance as defined here, the
role of complementarities drives the system down a path from which it is difficult to later
depart. By “complementarities” I have in mind governance elements that create value because
they make the existing system work better as a whole and that the “efficiency” of an element
cannot be separated from the question of “fit.”
One of the major corporate governance questions posed by path dependence and
complementarity can be usefully framed in terms of Part I’s operating system metaphor: in a
24

“[I]ndustrial districts are path dependent – an industrial district's location may result not
from the invisible hand of efficiency, but from ‘the details of the seemingly transient and
adventitious circumstance'.’” Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128 and Covenants not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
575, 577 (1999), quoting Paul A. David & Joshua L. Rosenboom, Marshallian Factor Market
Externalities and the Dynamics of Industrial Localization, 28 J. Urban Econ. 349, 368 (1990.)
25 Masahisa Fujita & Jacques-Frangois Thisse, Economics of Agglomeration, 10 J. Japanese
& Int'l Econ. 339, 341 (1996); Paul Krugman, Space: The Final Frontier, J. Econ. Persp., Spring
1998, at 161, 161.
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world of increasingly global product and capital markets, is there room for multiple corporate
operating systems? Do particular corporate governance systems give rise to sustainable
competitive advantage in particular product markets or economic circumstances? What
happens if a particular governance system was efficient until a change in the market renders it
less efficient than that of new competitors and path dependency slows adjustment? 26

The Japanese Example
The development of Japanese corporate governance exemplifies the influence of
complementarities on the persistence of corporate governance structure as broadly defined in
Part I. Suppose one begins with an initial condition of a commitment to lifetime employment
for a large number of employees, as was the case in the development of post-war Japanese
corporate governance.27 The next question becomes the influence of that initial condition on a
corporation’s production process. Because the norm of lifetime employment makes human
capital a long-term asset, the company will sensibly make substantial firm-specific human
capital investments in its employees, thus developing a workforce that supports team and
26

Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim M. Clark, The Reorganization of Existing Product Technologies
and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 Admin. Sci. Qtly. 9 (1990), illustrates this point by
demonstrating that the market leader in one generation of product architecture loses out in the
next, weighed down by having to unlearn all of the capabilities that made it succeed in the prior
generation. The same analysis applies when the question is posed with respect to competition
between national governance systems. For the application of this analysis to the effect of
changes in product markets on competition between national governance systems, see Gilson,
supra note 22, at 329-34.
27 A commitment to lifetime employment was itself a response to labor conditions in postWorld War II occupied Japan manifested by labor occupation of factories and the belief that it
was needed to constrain the communist movement in Japan. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark Roe,
Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99
Col. L. Rev. 508 (1999).
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horizontal coordination.28
In turn, the need to protect this long-term investment in human capital fits best with
bank, as opposed to stock market-based, financing, to prevent the stock market from upsetting
the company’s implicit commitments to labor. Bank-based finance elevates the role of the
bank as the monitor of managerial performance, rather than the public shareholders; this
means suppressing public shareholders’ rights and expectations relative to the bank’s. The
need to monitor the performance of a management freed from stock market oversight thus led
to the post-World War II Japanese main bank system. A single bank (typically leading a
syndicate of banks) directly monitored a company’s investment choices through the company’s
need to borrow to fund new projects, and through the information about the company’s cash
flow and performance that came to the bank through its provision of the company’s general
banking services.29 Commonly, the main bank and the other banks that participated in
providing loans to the company also held significant amounts of the company’s equity, again
out of a concern that a hostile takeover might upset the company’s labor and financing
arrangements.
If the company fell on hard times, the main bank was expected to bail out the company,
through the provision of additional funds, but at the price of displacement of management with
bank employees. The main bank bailout expectation was understood to be “an institutional
arrangement complementary to the system of permanent employment.” Bailout “helps to
28

See Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ. Lit. 1
(1990).
29 The collection of articles in The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and
Transforming Economies (M. Aoki & H. Patrick, eds.) depicts the main bank system at its
apogee.

15

preserve the firm-specific human assets accumulated in the framework of the lifetime
employment system and hence provides incentives for them to be generated in the first
place.”30 In turn, this package of attributes and the complementary internal production
methods are complementary to particular kinds of activity. The Japanese governance system,
with its large investment in firm-specific employee human capital, is very effective when
innovation is linear and depends importantly on teamwork, but much less effective when
innovation is discontinuous – the Japanese structure does not lend itself to Schumpetarian (or
Christensen-style31) disruption.32 The overall result has been a tightly integrated system of
production that has been difficult to change in response to changing business conditions and
opportunities for innovation.
In Milgrom and Robert’s terms, the relationship among these governance and
associated organizational characteristics is supermodular. By that term they mean that at each
decision node where a new governance element or characteristic must be added to the existing
system, the corporation will choose from among the alternatives that which best “fits” with the
already present elements. That fit, in turn, is a function not just of the efficiency of the new
element standing alone – the increased productivity that results from adding the new element - but as well of the new element’s capacity to improve the performance of the existing
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Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick & Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System: An
Introductory Overview 3, 18, in The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing
and Transforming Economies (M. Aoki & H. Patrick eds. 1995)
31 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great
Firms to Fail (1997).
32 See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism 35, in Varieties
Of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice eds. 2001); Aoki, supra note 29.
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elements, the extent to which it is supermodular.33
The complementarity among elements of the system then is a barrier to reform of the
system because changing one element in the system results in degrading the performance of all
other system elements to which that element was complementary. Just as adding a
complementary element increased system performance by more than its own contribution,
removing an element, by regulatory design or voluntarily in response to changed economic
conditions, reduces performance of all elements. Like financial leverage, supermodularity
steepens the performance curve both on the upside and on the downside: short of changing all
elements of the system at once, reform will result in reduced system performance until enough
of the system changes to recreate complementarities among the new and remaining elements.
Continuing the Japanese example, the combination of allowing Japanese companies to access
non-Japanese sources of capital through the Eurodollar market and the enormous success of
Japanese companies such that projects could be financed through cash flow rather than bankprovided project finance, eroded the role of the main bank. The contemporaneous drop in the
value of the Nikkei reduced the value of the banks’ cross holdings in its customer companies,
which necessitated sales of significant amounts of those holdings to maintain bank compliance
with capital requirements.34 At the same time, conditions in many product markets came to
favor discontinuous innovation rather than linear innovation. Reduced performance of any part
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Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 15.
See Hideaki Miyajima and Fumiaki Kuroki, The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding in Japan:
Causes, Effects, and Implications, in Corporate Governance In Japan: Institutional Change And
Organizational Diversity 79 (Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson and Hideaki Miyajima (eds.),
2007).
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of a governance system built on complementarities reduced the performance of the entire
Japanese governance system, yet the previously efficient complementarities create a barrier to
reform.
This analysis provides background to help understand why the recent corporate
governance reform proposals of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe represent more than tinkering of
relationships between shareholders and managers. The main bank system has not functioned
for years, cross-shareholdings are of lesser significance, and company act revisions provide a
better framework for activist investors and reflect a conscious effort to use government
intervention to overcome path dependencies that sustain a no-longer advantageous system of
governance and production. Nonetheless, there has been little change in the labor market,
including especially the continued absence of an external market for managerial talent; and the
actual operation of Japanese corporate governance – the Japanese corporation’s operating
system – remains familiar.

Expanding the Complementarity Concept: Varieties of Capitalism
The transformation of corporate law into corporate governance discussed in Part I and
the recognition of the impact of complementarities within a single country’s governance system
was importantly expanded through a literature that has been styled “the varieties of
capitalism”.35 A governance system experiences path-dependent complementarities not only
internally among a company’s factors of production, but also among a country’s corporate
governance system and other social and economic institutions, including, importantly, the role
35

See generally, Varieties Of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations Of Comparative
Advantage (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds. 2001).
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of the state. Simplifying the more complex yet elegant structure of the literature, different
countries have different varieties of capitalism. A capitalist system necessarily has more or less
coordination among labor markets, corporate governance arrangements, capital markets, and
the educational system that provides worker training both outside and inside the firm
consistent with the skill sets associated with firm organization and production. The state’s
political and social system – for example the government’s role in the economy both directly
through state ownership and also through the regulatory regime – must fit with the overall
structure dictated by the interaction of the other elements. In turn, the institutions through
which government and social influences operate are both forged through the relationships
among the various inputs to the particular form of capitalism and serve as the field on which
those controlling the input strategically interact.36
The result is a stylized typology of two general forms of economic and political
organization. Each displays, although the authors do not use the term, supermodularity – the
pieces evolve to facilitate the functioning of a particular variety of capitalism and to reinforce
each of its elements. In this account, the two rough forms of political economy are called
“liberal market economies” (LME) and “coordinated market economies“ (CME). In LMEs, firms
coordinate their activities largely through hierarchies within the firm and through competitive
markets outside the firm.37 The basic tools are said to be contracts and arm’s length

36
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Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism 3, supra n. 32.
Id. at 8.
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arrangements.38 In CMEs, firm activities operate importantly through non-market
arrangements, relying on relational arrangements supported by reputation and, more
generally, through incomplete contracting supported by public and private regulatory
institutions. Firms and markets are organized through strategic interaction among firms and
other institutions. “In some nations, for instance, firms rely primarily on formal contracts and
highly competitive markets to organize relationships with their employees and suppliers of
finance, while, in others, firms coordinate these endeavors differently.”39 It will be obvious, for
example, into which category the Japanese main bank system falls.
The last element in the analysis is dynamic: each system’s political, social and corporate
governance institutions evolve in a path-dependent fashion from an initial condition to a
coordinated structure of complementary institutions driven by choices based on
supermodularity and complementarities: “nations with a particular kind of coordination in one
sphere of the economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as
well.”40 For example, a stock market-based capital market implies market-based institutions in
the financial sector consistent with the development of a vibrant venture capital market not
generally present in countries with a bank-centered capital market41 and a labor market
characterized by employment at will, while extensive employment protection is associated with
38

Later developments in contract theory complicate the Hall and Soskice framing. In LMEs,
formal and informal contracts can be complementary, supporting relational arrangements. See
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 13.
39 Hall & Soskice, supra note 32, at 9.
40 Id. at 18. Mark Roe, for example, explores in detail the interaction between a country’s
political institutions and its corporate governance practices. See Mark J. Roe, Political
Determinants of Corporate Governance (2006)
41 See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J.Fin. Econ. 243 (1998).
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non-market coordination of industrial relations.42 Similarly, stockmarket-based capital markets
are associated with market monitoring of company performance through control contests,
while bank-centered capital markets are associated with bank-mediated monitoring and the
absence of stockholder driven control contests. On this account, the United States and the
United Kingdom exemplify LME nations while Germany and Japan are CME nations.
My goal in this section was to further complicate our understanding of corporate law
and corporate governance by embedding governance in a broader framework whose
components are complementary and by highlighting the dynamics of that broader system. The
“varieties of capitalism” approach takes us part of the way. On the one hand, it stresses how
different systems came to their present form. On the other, however, it does not fully address
the tension between path dependency and the need for a particular variety to respond to
changes in markets and products. For example, the capacity of globalization and technology to
disrupt existing industry and employment patterns highlights the importance of the extent to
which particular varieties (and sub-varieties) of capitalism are adaptively efficient.43 The U.S.
system is said to be adaptively efficient but at the same time is criticized for being too “shortterm” oriented, while the Japanese system was praised for its capacity to credibly commit to
long-term investment horizons, but appears to be slow in adapting to significant changes in
markets and technologies.44
This poses what now may be the most interesting question, to which I will return in the
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Hall & Soskice, Introduction, supra note 32.
See Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 36
(1990).
44 This is a debate that goes back at least 25 years. See Gilson, supra note 6, at 332-33.
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conclusion: can a single system be both adaptive and committed? To close with a speculation,
corporate governance serves to support risk transfer. As capital markets become more
complete, additional mechanisms of transfer become available. The ability to transfer risk in
slices through derivatives, in contrast to a broadband risk-bearing instrument like common
stock, creates the option of a company remaining privately held as a commitment device to a
particular investment horizon that matches its markets and skills.45 From this perspective,
adaption takes place through self-selection at the company level, rather than at the system
level.
A final qualification remains. The “varieties of capitalism” approach dates from the turn
of the millennium. We now observe new governance patterns evolving from scratch where
there is no prior path. Chinese state capitalism offers a form of coordinated system, but one in
which the resolution of tensions among stakeholders more flows directly through the state and
party apparatus rather than through the interaction between the company and other relational
institutions; a question remains as to whether corporate governance and its formal
components serve the same function in the Chinese system that they do in other varieties of
capitalism.46
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Ronald J. Gilson & Charles Whitehead, Public Ownership, Agency Costs and Complete Capital
Markets, 108 Columbia Law Review 231 (2008), discusses the potential for this method of
adaptive efficiency.
46 Curtis Milhaupt raises the question of whether corporate governance in China serves the
same function as in other systems, and so whether familiar comparative analysis is helpful.
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Chinese Corporate Capitalism in Comparative Context (October 13, 2015).
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 522. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2673797. Elsewhere Lin and Milhaupt helpfully describe the existing
pattern and structures of Chinese government ownership of large companies, posing the
question of whether the challenge is not the particular elements of Chinese corporate

22

III. Analytic Models in Corporate Governance
To this point, I have broadly summarized the evolution of corporate law into corporate
governance and then from corporate governance as a stand-alone concept into a component of
a particular capitalist system made up of complimentary sub-systems and whose path
dependency defines the characteristics of the broader system’s adaptive dynamics. Like
evolutionary systems more generally, the movement was towards greater complexity. Part III
now further emphasizes complexity by critically assessing recent efforts to simplify, rather than
complicate, our understanding of corporate governance through single factor governance
models. As can be predicted from the accounts in Parts I and II, I view these models as
interesting and intriguing, but inevitably partial, the equivalents of a painter’s studies for a
larger work. For the kind of analytic non-formal models used by legal academics, the right
methodological move is to complicate, not simplify. Perhaps most important, these single
factor models are largely static, immune in their positive and normative analysis to the
influence of the broader concept of governance addressed in Part II.
A. Models in Corporate Law
Some 40 years after economics began making important inroads into corporate law
scholarship, a significant amount of academic, but not judicial, attention is still directed at
devising the right “model” of corporate law and governance.47 The “shareholder primacy”

governance, but whether there is a span-of-control problem that suggests a conglomerate on
steroids. See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions:
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 67 Stan. L.Rev. 697 (2013).
47 It is interesting that the Delaware judiciary appears to be more sensitive to the dynamic s of
corporate governance. While the broad claim of the adaptive character of Delaware corporate
law dates to the Supreme Court’s approval of an early variety of the poison pill in Unocal Corp.
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model contests with the “stakeholders” model, which in turn confronts the “team production”
model and the “director primacy” model. In Part III I argue that this debate, as engaging,
interesting and extended as it has been, is ultimately a blind alley, both theoretically and
practically. The reasons are not complicated, although as I have suggested in Parts I and II we
have come to understand that the behavior that this dialogue has sought to explain is quite
complicated. Indeed, it is the very complexity of the phenomenon to be explained that allows a
simple critique of singular static explanations.
Each of these “models” seeks to explain the structure and performance of complex
business organizations – law is relevant only to the extent that it interacts with other factors in
shaping the corporation’s operating system – by reference to a single explanatory variable. The
single variable character of the contending accounts has resulted in an oddly driven circular
debate that is prolonged because those proffering each model defend it by emphasizing the
limits of the others – something like an academic perpetual motion machine. In fact, each of
the models is part of a more complicated description of a very complex phenomenon.
Stephen Bainbridge, whose entry into the single factor horse race I will address later in
this section, invokes the fable of the blind men and the elephant in arguing that an
overarching concept of the corporation is needed.48 An account of corporate organization that
does not feature prominently each of the contending model’s central features – shareholders,
v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), the Delaware courts appear to have begun
recognizing the impact on governance of the intermediation of equity and the implication for
legal rules. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, supra note 6.
48 Stephan M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation, (a.k.a. Criteria - Just say No,
2 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 79, 83 (2005). Lynn Stout, whose competing model is also addressed in
Part III, invokes the parable as well. Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2 Deakins L.
Rev. 1 (2004).
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managers and employees, stakeholders, and directors – is limited to explaining only part of the
phenomenon. Elephants have trunks, tails, ears and legs; corporations have shareholders,
managers and employees, stakeholders and directors. Making the elephant walk and the
corporation function effectively requires that all of these parts work together – the task is
organizational intelligent design or, as I have called the exercise more generally, transaction
cost engineering.49 And that requires an explanation that focuses on more than one factor,
however overarching. The problem of understanding corporate organization is interesting and
hard because it requires explaining the interaction of multiple inputs in a dynamic setting, a
problem that vexes both formal and informal modelers.
I should pause for a moment to clarify what I mean by a model. Of course, none of the
accounts I address here involve a formal mathematical model of the sort familiar from the
economic and finance literatures. They are more in the style of an informal analytic narrative,50
which persuades because its explanation rings true rather than because the equations
balance.51 This technique is a kind of verbal regression that restricts the degrees of freedom in
explaining a phenomenon by complicating rather than simplifying. A real regression first
simplifies the problem as the interaction of two variables, and then measures the power of the
explanation by the closeness of the data points – the dots -- to the least square line.52 An
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See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing: 93
Yale L.J. 239 (1984).
50 See Robert H. Bates, Avner Grief, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal & Barry R. Weingast,
Analytic Narratives 3-23 ( 998).
51 This genre characterizes most of my own work as well, with the exception of occasional
efforts with more formally oriented colleagues. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz,
Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 43 Int. Rev. L & Econ. 115 (2015).
52 For present purposes, I do not address multiple variable analysis.
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analytic regression operates in exactly the opposite fashion, by increasing the number of dots
that must be connected, but now by a narrative rather than by a regression line. A workshop
question that asks “what about” a particular fact, challenges the verbal regression with a dot
that the presenter’s explanation of a phenomenon cannot explain, and so limits the degrees of
freedom in constructing a narrative explanation.
In the remainder of this Part I will briefly survey the contending models -- stakeholders,
team production, director primacy, and shareholder primacy – highlighting both why each
model’s animating factor is important and why it is partial. In doing so I will not do justice
either to the extensive literature associated with each model or the elegance of some of the
debate.53 My point is simply that standing alone, none of the single factor models explains the
complex phenomenon of the governance of corporations in a dynamic context.
B. Stakeholder Model
A stakeholder model of corporation law or governance recognizes the truism that
corporations are a major social institution that is at the core of a capitalist system. In the
United States, large public corporations produce the bulk of GDP, employ vast numbers of
workers and so support the stability of families and communities, and pay taxes at every level
of the nation – local, state and federal. It has become commonplace to credit the corporate
form with a significant role in economic productivity. For example, writing in 1926, the
Economist magazine trumpeted this role:
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examples. Otherwise, I fear, the references will get in the way of the argument.
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Economic historians of the future may assign to the nameless
inventor of the principle of limited liability, as applied to
trading corporations, a place of honor with Watt and
Stephenson, and other pioneers of the industrial revolution.
The genius of these men produced the means by which man’s
command of natural resources has multiplied many times
over; the limited liability company the means by which huger
aggregations of capital required to give effect to their
discoveries were collected, organized and efficiently
administered.54
It then follows simply enough that all those affected by the performance of the
corporation have an interest in its operation, which leads in turn to an economic measure of
social welfare against which a corporation’s performance can be measured: as framed by
economists Patrick Bolton, Marco Becht and Alicia Roell, the net gain to all those doing
business with the company, thereby requiring a netting of gains and losses among, for
example, customers, suppliers, employees, communities and shareholders.55
Intertwined with this measure of overall efficiency, however, is a distributional
concern. If the gains arising from the corporation’s activity are not shared among stakeholders
in a fashion perceived as equitable, the social legitimacy necessary to support efficient
production breaks down, a framing that resonates with the current income equality debate
and the populist themes now current in U.S. politics across both the Democratic and
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the Economics of Finance, Vol. 1, pp. 1- 109 (2003). See Michael Magill, Martine Quinzil & JeanCharles Rochet, “A Theory of the Stakeholder Corporation,” 83 Econometrica 1685 (2015).
Roberta Romano traces recognition in the United States of corporations’ need to orchestrate
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Republican parties.56 In the more recent governance debate, the stakeholder model is
situated as a response to the position Hansmann and Kraakman describe as now dominant:
that the corporation should be run to maximize shareholder profits.57
What is missing in the stakeholder account, however, is the link between the
stakeholder model and production. While production may depend on a broad perception that
the fruits of production are equitably distributed, in the absence of efficient production, that
task is made more difficult when there is less to distribute. A fair criticism is that too little
attention is given to the governance mechanisms through which stakeholder interests can be
taken into account consistent with efficient production. To be sure, stakeholder board
representation has been a matter of debate but hardly implementation in the United States,
and co-determination is a familiar but narrow European phenomenon.58 And as Henry
Hansmann pointed out some years ago, there is no legal reason why large corporations are
capital rather than labor cooperatives.59
Yet the problem with a stakeholder model remains: it is a one factor model, largely
concerned with distributional issues as a counterpoint but not as an alternative to shareholder
primacy. To be sure, behavioral economics provides evidence that perceptions of fairness may

56
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note 63 infra.
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in some circumstances be complementary to, rather than in tension with, maximizing
production60 and that framing the corporate purpose only in terms of shareholder value may
dissuade boards of directors from taking action that increases the size of the pie if it reduces
the piece shareholders receive. However, what remains largely unaddressed in the stakeholder
discussion is how to hold accountable the corporate decision makers, composed largely of
white, older men and, almost without exception, wealthy people whatever their ethnicity or
gender, for the size of the pie the corporation creates or for its distribution.
B. Team Production
A team production theory of corporate governance, energetically advanced by Margaret
Blair and Lynn Stout, seeks to fill the gap in stakeholder theory by directly linking a concern with
non-shareholder constituencies, especially employees, to firm productivity.61 The model,
stated simply, is that efficient production is a function of firm-specific investment by a wide
range of stakeholders -- a team, rather than a hierarchy. However, if a stakeholder’s firmspecific investment is subject to opportunistic grabbing by a different stakeholder --for
example, the shareholders -- the stakeholder will be less willing to make the efficient level of
investment. For example, employees may be reluctant to make firm-specific human capital
investments if shareholders subsequently can renege on the firm’s promise to pay the
employee a return on that investment.62
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The empirical evidence is collected in Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 1, at 1384-86.
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The need to protect all stakeholders’ firm specific investments gives rise to the team
production model’s governance implications. The model calls for a decision-maker who will
coordinate the contributions of different stakeholders to protect their expectations of a return
on their investments; i.e., to see that the stakeholders play well together and so increase the
size of the pie rather than squabbling over efforts of one stakeholder group to expropriate a
different group’s piece. Blair and Stout assign this function to the board of directors who
operate, in their somewhat awkward term, as “mediating hierarchs,” balancing the various
stakeholders’ interactions, and so facilitating the right ex ante level of specific investment by all
parties.
The reader will recognize that the team production model closely tracks the efficiency
analysis of the Japanese main bank governance model considered in Part II; Japanese horizontal
organization of production is framed, as is the team production model, in contrast to U.S.
vertical organization. In the Japanese governance model, lifetime employment, protected by
reflect the stakeholders’ opportunism. The usual reference for the argument that shareholders
can opportunistically shift returns from other stakeholders to themselves is Andrei Shleifer &
Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in Hostile Takeovers: Causes and
Consequences 33 in (A. Auerbach ed. 1988). For present purposes I note only that the analysis
does not parse. In short form, Shleifer and Summers use post-airline deregulation as the
vehicle to examine shareholder opportunism. The effect of deregulation was to allow entry of
low cost airlines with the result that the loss of the regulatory rents that had accrued to capital
and labor caused losses to both. From this perspective, the takeovers that hit the industry were
a process of allocating those losses between labor and capital. While Shleifer and Summers
argue that the resulting allocation violated an implicit contract between airline employees and
management, they do not explain how one would identify the terms of an implicit contract
concerning an event – deregulation – that was not anticipated. They do suggest that the
reallocation was only possible because post-takeover management did not value the prior
management’s reputation and the resulting ability to enter into implicit contracts. However,
they do not explain why an asset that is valuable to prior management is not equally valuable to
post-takeover management. See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of
Corporate Acquisitions 620-622 (1995).

30

limited reliance on equity financing and main bank monitoring, encourages employees to make
firm-specific human capital investment by protecting them from opportunistic behavior by
shareholders, and so provides a foundation for a very efficient manufacturing system that is
built around horizontal planning, decision-making and production processes. But the reader
will also recall that the advantage of Japanese horizontal organization of production is
contextual. First, it is more effective than U.S. style hierarchical organization when innovation is
linear, as in precision manufacturing, but inferior to the U.S style when innovation is
discontinuous. Second, team production’s stability depends on conditions in the capital and
product markets – increasing alternative sources of capital, for example, degraded the critical
role of the main bank, as did the success of the companies themselves, who then could avoid
main bank monitoring by financing projects through internally generated funds.
Unlike Aoki’s development of “J form governance”,63 Blair and Stout’s claim for team
production is largely acontextual. The problem is that, as analysis of Japanese governance
shows, team production is a strategy, not the “right” way to organize governance or
production; it fits some industries, some production techniques and some clusters of
complementary elements of one variety of capitalism at particular times, but not others.
Indeed, in some contexts, horizontal teams and vertical non-teams both may work. The
difference in strategies between Costco and Sam’s Club, both U.S. big box membership grocery
and sundries stores, is a good example. They are direct competitors but they treat their
workers quite differently. Costco pays higher wages, provides healthcare, etc. Costco’s
position is that company profits are higher if their workers like their jobs and want to keep
63
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them (a business person’s account of an efficiency wage story). Sam’s Club (owned by
Walmart) treats its workers materially worse than Costco, but nonetheless performs
adequately.64
A second problem is more directly governance related: who polices the behavior of the
mediating hierarches even in a team production context? In the U.S. governance model, the
only formal source of constraint is the right of only one stakeholder – the shareholders – to
vote. However, as Blair and Stout stress, so long as the corporation resembles the Berle and
Means pattern of widely distributed ownership, the right to vote -and so the power to monitor
the hierarchs- is dramatically diluted by coordination costs: proxy contests are expensive and
while their costs are borne by the proponent of the fight, the gains are shared by all
shareholders. This leaves the hierarchs on a very long leash indeed.
The problem with hierarchs then is that strategy and governance follow changes in the
capital market rather than lead it.65 The wide discretion Blair and Stout claim for the hierarchs
was first challenged by the development of junk bonds In the 1980s.66 The availability of
financing to corporate outsiders allowed a large increase in hostile takeovers that were used to
take apart the residue of the failure of the 1970s conglomerate experiment despite the
organizational form’s cross-subsidization of non-shareholder participants. The result was to
significantly shorten management’s leash. Non-statutory monitoring techniques, like tender
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66 See Ronald J. Gilson, Catalyzing Corporate Governance: The Evolution of the United States’
System in the 1980s and 1990s, 24 Corp. & Sec. L.J. 143 (2006).
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offers, provided a shortcut around the coordination costs associated with widely distributed
shareholdings: Even small shareholders could recognize a large premium when one was
offered, although the need to secure financing to purchase the target limited the size of the
companies that were potential targets. The debate over efforts to constrain capital market
monitoring though target company defensive tactics – the extent to which mediating hierarchs
could prevent shareholders from accepting a hostile bid – then raged on for 30 years.
More recently, the capital market fault line shifted again – ownership of equity became
increasingly intermediated through institutional investors holding stock as record owners for
widely dispersed beneficial owners. Shareholdings in U.S. public corporations are now quite
concentrated as a result of equity intermediation – a number of institutions whose
representatives could be seated around a large board room table collectively held voting rights
that could control most corporations – ushering in what Jeff Gordon and I have called “Agency
Capitalism.”67 At this point, activist hedge funds and other specialized shareholder activists
entered the fray as complements to the new ownership concentration. Rather than buying
targets themselves, such activists tee-up strategic business choices for decision by “reticent”
rather than passive institutional shareholders and in that way serve as a catalyst for the
expression of institutional shareholder voice. This further erodes the coordination costs barrier
to monitoring mediating hierarchs. Because an activist’s own stock purchase need be only large
enough to credibly signal its conviction in its proposals, even the largest public corporations are
potentially “in play.” Put differently, the activist shareholders differ from the raiders of the
1980s in that instead of leveraging the target’s balance sheet to finance a takeover, they
67

Gilson & Gordon, supra note 6.
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leverage the equity holdings of institutional investors to win a proxy contest conditional on
convincing the institutional investors that the activist’s proposal is sound.68 And here context is
again central. If the mediating hierarchs are largely walled off from capital market monitoring,
now through proxy fights rather than takeovers, companies’ response to changes in the
business environment are slowed down, a very undesirable result if, as appears to be the case,
the rate of change in the business environment is increasing. Bad governance then leads to bad
strategy.
D. Director Primacy
Stephen Bainbridge proffers a director primacy model as a counterpoint to both the
stakeholder and team production models on the one hand, and as an element of a shareholder
primacy model on the other.69 The differences among those models are nicely organized
around two simple concepts Bainbridge proffers: the corporation’s ends and the means by
which those ends are achieved. Director primacy differs sharply from the stakeholder model
and somewhat more obliquely from team production on the ends sought. It includes an
undiluted commitment to “shareholder wealth maximization” 70 as the measuring rod of a
corporation’s performance. The significant difference between director primacy and team
production, conceptually but not necessarily operationally, concerns the means by which
shareholder wealth maximization is achieved. Both team production and director primacy
share a commitment to a very long leash for boards of directors, relegating shareholders to a
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Id.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
Nw. U.L. Rev. 547 (2002).
70 Id. at 580.
69
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limited role as a vehicle for constrained capital market intervention. The shareholders’ cameo
role is expected to be limited to those unusual circumstances when the shortfall in corporate
performance, whether in its use of existing assets or in its failure to reach out for new
opportunities, exceeds the coordination costs of energizing shareholders either directly through
a takeover or indirectly through elections. In this important respect, team production and
director primacy share a central feature of Aoki’s description of Japanese corporate governance
discussed in Part II:71 capital market intervention, in Japan through main bank intercession and
in the U.S. through the stock market, should be triggered only by very poor performance.72
Thus, central to both models is the limited role of shareholders; under both team
production and director primacy, management and directors are on a very long leash. Team
production and director primacy differ, however, not only in the intellectual foundation of their

71 See

Aoki, supra note 28; Aoki, Patrick & Sheard, supra note 30. Japan may actually illustrate
how the stakeholder model, team production, and director primacy can all co-exist in one
system (suggesting that they need not be distinct “models” at all). That is, the Japanese firm in
its heyday favored employees over shareholders. Those employees engaged in a tournament to
become directors, whereupon they would reap the largest rewards (partly through tenure) and
play the role of Blair & Stout’s mediating hierarchs. Because these senior managers were largely
insulated from capital market pressures, and due to the absence of a lateral market for
managerial talent, the system was one of director primacy in the extreme. I am grateful to
Curtis Milhaupt for making this connection.
72 In the 1980s, when hostile takeovers were dismantling the failed conglomerate experiment,
firms representing 1-3% of total stock market value underwent leveraged buyouts each year
from 1985-1988. Bengt Holstrom & Steven Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity
in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. Econ. Perspec. 121 (2001). This volume
of takeovers led to a report by the Council on Competiveness, headed by Harvard Business
School strategy professor Michael Porter, extolling the Japanese governance system: “In
general, the U.S. system is geared to optimize short-term returns, the Japanese and German
systems optimize long-term returns.” Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way
American Invests in Industry, 5 J.Appl. Corp. Fin. 4 (1992). The phenomenon generalizes:
However long management and the board’s leash, when the capital market begins to tug on it,
those being tugged don’t like it. See Part IIIE infra.
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respective models – Blair and Stout channeling Alchian and Demsetz73 and Holstrom74 and
Bainbridge building on Coase75 and Arrow76 – but also in the breadth of their claim. Fairly
assessed, team production is a particular production strategy, not a governance model for all
seasons. Director primacy makes the broader claim: it purports to be a generally applicable
governance structure. In striking the governance balance between, in Arrow’s terms,
“authority” and “responsibility,” it plainly favors authority – management over shareholders.
But this broader claim founders on the same rock that sunk team production’s broader claim.
Japan’s main bank primacy model, like director primacy protecting management save in
dire circumstances, no longer worked when the structure of the Japanese economy changed as
a result of Japanese corporations’ success and the contemporaneous opening of the Japanese
capital market. Director primacy’s stability and its normative appeal depend on circumstances
in the capital market: the cost of shareholder coordination sets the limit on director discretion,
in Arrow’s terms again, setting the efficient tradeoff between authority and responsibility. The
re-concentrated ownership of large public U.S. corporations as catalyzed by activist investors
dramatically reduced the shareholder coordination costs in challenging managements and
boards; this shortened the leash. But the critical new feature of “coordination” was the
activists’ role as credible information intermediaries. Insofar as the board’s claim to “authority”
73

See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972), discussed in Blair & Stout, supra note 66, at 26668.
74 See Bengt Holstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982), discussed in Blair
and Scott, supra note 61, at 268-269.
75 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 386 (1937), discussed in Bainbridge, supra note 69,
at 547.
76 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (1974), discussed in Bainbridge, supra note 69,
at 57-59.
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rested on both a purported informational advantage over, and the cost of informing, widely
dispersed shareholders, the activists’ information-based counterview shifted the balance, as
evidenced by the voting behavior of sophisticated institutional investors. Arrow himself
anticipated that if smaller groups could assess specific claims of error on the part of those with
authority, responsibility could be achieved without so general a review that authority was
dissipated and information costs would soar.77 When a small number of institutional
shareholders hold effective control and the information necessary to assess the claimed error
of those in authority is provided in substantial measure by activists, the capital market will have
created a version of Arrow’s recommended “review group.”
Stated most simply, the “right” governance model is contextual. It depends on what the
particular company does and on conditions in the capital market; in other words, a governance
model must be dynamic. One factor models that cannot accommodate changes in either the
product market or the capita market are too simple to accommodate the complexity of the
business environment in which corporations function.78
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Arrow, supra note 76, at 78-79.
As a style of proof that their model is right (and that others are wrong), both Blair and Stout
and Bainbridge offer extended arguments that current and historical corporate law is consistent
with their respective models. I do not discuss these efforts here for two reasons. First, they
necessarily depend on some version of an older argument that the common law, in this case
corporate law, is efficient; without needing to rely on Alchian and Demsetz, Holstrom, Coase
and Arrow, the process of case selection (and the structure of other law-making institutions)
will result in efficient rules. This claim, whose intuition was understandable when first made,
has not fared well. Absent a mechanism that leads to efficient outcomes based on distributed
incentives, the claim devolves into a belief that generalist judges can be expected to get the
answer right. My task here is instrumental, intelligent design rather than a broad belief in the
operation of the judicial system. Put differently, a claim of survivorship in favor of an
observable structure is a weak proof of efficiency. Second, invocation of the consistency of
statutory rules and judicial decisions with the proffered models is an “inside baseball”
78
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E. Shareholder Primacy
Setting out the shareholder primacy model is somewhat more complicated than the
description of the stakeholder, team production and director primacy model. In Bainbridge’s
nice dichotomy, shareholder primacy is used as a label for both an end and a means; it is at
once the corporation’s goal but also how that goal should be achieved. Thus, there is a need to
be precise about the subject under examination. With respect to the end of corporate
governance, I start with a broad definition of social welfare in the organization of public
corporations: the net impact on all those effected by the company, thereby requiring a netting
of gains and losses among, for example, customers, suppliers, employees, communities and
shareholders, in effect Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with a broad reach of whose utility counts.79
With respect to means, my focus in this section is the role assigned to shareholders. For
this purpose, we have to bring in another literature, beginning in the early 1980s and continued

argument. The authors discussed in the text (and I) are, with the exception of one economist
whose appointment is in a law school, lawyers. Thus, tying a claim for a particular model back
to legal arguments is understandable but backwards: In an intelligent design context, existing
legal institutions and rules are a tool, not evidence of efficiency.
79 See note 56 supra. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman point out that even this broad
measure of social welfare is contestable. “For many individuals, increasing social stability may
be worth sacrificing a meaningful amount of productivity as measured -- as it conventionally is - in terms of the net value of market transactions. … It is not crazy to feel that a leisurely daily
walk to a dependable workplace in the well-preserved medieval city of one’s birth is preferable
to lower prices on smartphones.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End
of History for Corporate Law, in Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects
(Abdul Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds. 2012). Of course, this tradeoff is hardly limited to
corporate governance, as a moment’s reflection on the current debate over the desirability of
lowering trade barriers reminds. Addressing the broader issue is beyond my ambitions here
other than to note that there is nothing in a Kaldor-Hicks analysis that counsels against
redistribution of gains and losses.
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to date by the energy of Lucian Bebchuk among others, who argues for a much broader role for
shareholders than contemplated by either Blair and Stout or Bainbridge.
In important but unfortunate respects, the debate over shareholder primacy was
clouded by some of its early framing. Two characterizations are particularly regrettable: that
the allocation of authority through the corporate governance system turns on shareholder
ownership or, alternatively, on the specificity of different stakeholders’ contribution to the
corporation. The ownership claim – that the corporation should maximize shareholder wealth
because shareholders “owned” the corporation – was straightforward but far too simple. In
fact, we have known better than that from the beginning of the debate. Ownership is a bundle
of rights; which elements of the bundle we give to a particular party depends on what we want
to accomplish; the inquiry is instrumental not normative. That distinction was drawn sharply in
the corporate governance context as early as 1981. The shareholder’s governance role
depends on the organizational design needed to give residual claimants the power to assess
management and the board’s performance. “[I]ndeed, if the statute did not provide for
shareholders we would have to invent them.”80 Debates about the specificity of different
stakeholders’ contributions to the corporation were also little help; the relative character of
those contributions depended on the particular and changing character of the corporation’s
business environment, so it was difficult to generalize based on this characteristic.
Once we recognize that the problem with the firm specificity branch of the shareholder
primacy argument is that all stakeholders make contributions and the character of those
80

Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L.Rev. 819, 834n.56 (1981). Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel made
the same point in Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395 (1983).
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contributions, and hence the various stakeholders’ investment in the corporation, depends on
the firm’s strategy, the second characterization problem appears: it follows that the right
governance structure is also going to depend on context. Sometimes the contributions, driven
by the nature of the business and the corporation’s strategic response, support horizontal team
production; sometimes they support vertical hierarchical organization and sometimes a mix.
This appears from Figure One below, a stylized income statement. The figure illustrates
that each line item in an income statement reflects the participation of a different category of
stakeholders. And it requires little imagination to think of how all but the shareholders’
interests is conditional on circumstances. Different events will differentially effect the value of
different stakeholders’ inputs. Only the shareholders have an incentive to adjust the returns
other shareholders receive for their inputs, because the residual returns will depend on the
success of that adjustment. Put differently, one could substitute for the term “shareholder
primacy” that of “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency” as a description of the operative governance model,
and so match the label to the measure of social welfare.81
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I recognize the difficulty of specifying and then operationalizing a fully developed measure of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. However, I am concerned here with a real corporation’s operating
system, where the measure is pragmatic: does it work to manage the stakeholders competing
for the corporation’s revenues.
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Figure One
A Stakeholder Income Statement

Line item

Amount

Stakeholder

Sales

XXXXXX

Customers

Wages

XXXXXX

Employees

Cost of goods sold

XXXXXX

Suppliers

Taxes

XXXXXX

Community

Net Income

XXXXXX

Shareholders

It is apparent that, as the reference to the blind men and the elephant fable reveals,
corporate performance depends on the complex coordination of all stakeholders groups, taking
into account the particular context of the company’s business. We return to where we started
this part: the corporate elephant needs customers, employees, suppliers, communities and
shareholders to perform. That implies a basic structure of management monitored by
directors, with shareholders in the position of residual owners and having the vote – the right
to disrupt existing management through their influence on the identity of the directors. It is at
this point that the issue around shareholder primacy takes form. The team production and
director primacy model, for different reasons, share the view that shareholders’ role in
changing management should be formally limited – management’s leash must always be long.
As we’ve seen, the two positions as so framed share a more than passing relation to Aoki’s
description of Japanese management. The main bank in Japan and, from the perspective of the
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director primacy and team production models, shareholders in the U.S. can replace
management, but only when things get very bad.

But the Japanese experience also teaches that the efficient length of the leash depends
on history, strategy and conditions in the products and capital markets. The evolution of
complexity in our understanding of corporate governance highlights that the role of
shareholders and so the length of management’s leash depends on the circumstances. In the
1970s, management and directors experimented with conglomerate strategies. Consistent with
the team production and director primacy models, management and directors had the
autonomy to carry out the experiment. In the end, the experiment failed and changes in the
capital market – Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham’s development of junk bonds – shortened
management’s leash by facilitating shareholder-dependent bust-up hostile takeovers. The
length of management’s leash was shortened again in the new century by the growing
intermediation of equities and the rise of activist shareholders who levered institutional
investors’ equity holdings to extend capital market oversight to firms that were too big to take
over.
The lesson of this Part is that one factor corporate governance models are too simple to
explain the real world dynamics we observe. Hansmann and Kraakman are descriptively correct
that there seems to be convergence around a governance structure that generally
contemplates shareholders as the residual owner. In equilibrium, directors oversee
management’s efforts to coordinate the inputs of all stakeholders and their competing claims
on corporate revenues, with the particular resolution depending on the corporation’s product
market and strategy; shareholders have a limited function. When performance is lacking,
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whether because of poor performance, ill-advised strategy or delay in responding to changes in
the product market that degrade a firm’s capabilities, management’s leash shortens based on
the techniques available to shareholders through the capital market. Corporate governance
matters when the leash shortening is triggered by changes in the product market in which the
company participates, in the instruments the capital market provides, and in the pattern of
shareholdings that results from conditions in the capital market.
IV. Conclusion
In the end, corporate governance is messy, complicated and contextual because that is
the character of dynamic markets. And that is the point of this Chapter. The move from
corporate law to corporate governance reflects a move from a simple legal view of the
corporation to one that has become increasingly complex and dynamic, responding to the
increased complexity and dynamics of the capital, input and product markets that corporations
inhabit. And therein lies the problem with corporate governance models: at best, they are
snapshots, stills of a moment in a motion picture. Corporate governance is part of the
structure of an economy whose behavior, and hence whose architecture, is dictated by the
interaction among all of the markets in which the corporation operates, each of which is itself
in motion. In a sense we are confronted with a corporate governance version of the physicist’s
three body problem:82 the interaction of the bodies that influence the structure of corporate
governance are too complex to allow a prediction of the optimal governance structure going
forward.
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I understand the standard reference to be Henri Poincaire, New Methods of Celestial
Mechanics.
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Is there a lesson from recognizing the complexity of real world corporate governance? I
think so. It is the centrality of change. As discussed in Part II, there is a tradeoff between a
governance system that encourages long-term firm specific investment and one that is
mutable, quickly adapting to changes in the business environment.83 This tension between
stability and change is baked into a capitalist system. Change is the source of progress, but is
always risky since the established order more or less works, sometimes seemingly very well.84
Reinier Kraakman and I characterized the tension as a debate across the years between Burke
and Schumpeter:85 should we preserve what is working against a potentially disruptive
innovation?
Burke cast this tension in terms that anticipate today’s tendentious long-term versus
short-term debate. Remarking on the leaders of the French revolution, Burke stressed their
83

Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European
Corporate Governance Environment, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 161 (1992), emphasizes the
importance of a corporation’s mutability – its capacity to respond quickly to changes in its
business environment.
84 Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (2002), focuses on the dangers to market
leaders from staying with what seems to work and what they are good at: why industry leaders
fail to anticipate an innovation that devalues their skills and products, and as a result dilutes
their dominant position – in Christensen’s terms, a “disruptive” technology. The problem is not
that the leaders are poorly managed; rather they are attentive to their customers, continually
improve the quality and reduce the prices of their products, and usually anticipate what their
customers will want before their customers know it themselves. Instead of merely extending
the existing product architecture, a disruptive technology reflects so sharp a break with existing
strategies that neither a market leader nor its customers initially see the new technology’s
potential. When the disruptive technology develops so that it is generalized to the industry
core, the dominant firms are then displaced because they cannot respond quickly enough to
the change in the architecture of production. More recently, the concept has been extended to
any change in technology that severely degrades market leaders’ capabilities and opens the
door to new entrants. See Rebecca Henderson, The Innovator’s Dilemma as a Problem of
Organizational Competence, 23 J. Prod. Innov. Mngmnt. 5 (2006).
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short-term orientation: “The attachment to their country itself is only so far as it agrees with
some of their fleeting projects; it begins and ends with that scheme of polity which falls in with
their momentary opinion.”86 In contrast, Burke had great respect for the French aristocracy
who were threatened by the purported short-termists: “Of my best observation, compared
with my best inquiries, I found [the French] nobility for the greater part composed of men of
high spirit, and of a delicate sense of honour, both with regard to themselves individually, and
with regard to their whole corps, over whom they kept, beyond what is common in other
countries, a censorial eye.”87
Schumpeter’s repost to the Burkean fear of chaos has become familiar:
“The opening up of new markets and the organizational development
from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same
process of industrial mutation— … that incessantly revolutionizes the
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one,
incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the
essential fact about capitalism.” 88
From this perspective, the governance tradeoff – between stability and mutability –
depends on the predicted rate of future change in a particular industry and company. If the
second derivative of change is expected to be positive but whose direction is difficult to predict,
then a governance system that privileges mutability over stability will outperform. And here
path dependency raises its head a final, pessimistic, time. In a governance system
characterized by supermodularity, shifts from a commitment based governance system to one
that facilitates adaptation to changing conditions will be hard to accomplish. Again, Japan’s
86

Edmund Burke, Reflections On The Revolution In France (Frank M. Turner, ed., 2003)
(originally published in 1790).
87 Id. at 115.
88 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 82-83 82-83 (1942).
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slow progress at reforming the operation of its corporate governance system despite dramatic
changes in its formal corporate law stands witness to the problem.
This is an appropriate point to conclude. The move from corporate law to corporate
governance, and the resulting increase in complexity, allows us both to understand the
problems we need to solve and the difficulty of doing so.
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